加纳银行货币政策委员会（MPC）在 2024 年 1 月宣布，将关键政策利率下调 100 个基点，从 30% 降至 29%。这听起来像是在开玩笑。很难想象，我们加纳银行官员期望这 1% 的降幅 -- 从 30% 降至 29% -- 对贷款利率、通货膨胀率、汇率或经济增长产生什么影响，更别提他们期望从中了解或观察到什么了。我不禁怀疑他们是否已弄清国家利率、通货膨胀率和汇率之间的关联。

在预期通货膨胀率将 “在 2024 年底降至 15% ± 2%，并逐渐在 2025 年回到中期目标范围 8% ± 2%” 的情况下，他们犹豫不决地将利率降低 1% 至 29%，这尤其令人惊讶。我看不出预期的 15% ± 2% 通货膨胀率与高 29% 的货币政策利率之间有什么关系。这让人感觉我们的顶尖经济学家对自己或他们的预测缺乏信心。

更令人担忧的是，他们可能连自己的数字都不相信，鉴于他们新的 “复苏迹象” 的说法，而他们之前告诉我们经济已经 “转折”。

政策利率与公开市场操作

一般而言，中央银行的政策利率和公开市场操作旨在影响通货膨胀率。然而，加纳银行的官员们仍然对标题通货膨胀或年同比增长率念念不忘，因此无法摆脱他们反应性的货币政策方法，这种方法回应的是已经发生的事情，即过去一年的价格变化，而不是他们对通货膨胀的预期（今年的 15% ± 2%）。因此，政策利率的 1% 降幅似乎是对 12 月份标题通货膨胀率从 11 月份的 26.4% 下降到 23.2% 的反应。

因此，商业银行用作贷款参考的关键利率在六个月保持在 30% 之后，已经降至 29%。这同样是政府国内借款的固定参考利率，限制了政府作为最大借款者所能发挥的影响力。加纳银行经常提到“吸收过剩流动性”，却未明确指出何为最佳水平。但是，导致货币市场投资者获得 30% 以上回报的利率政策本身就有责任提供 “过剩流动性”。

短视的货币政策的受害者

我们国家长期以来一直受短视货币政策影响，该政策给经济带来严重结构性问题，已持续超 20 年。这种政策导致高利率，进而引发高通胀率、货币贬值、企业倒闭、失业率上升，以及贫困问题恶化，迫使许多年轻人寻求海外更好的发展机会。令人惊讶的是，国际货币基金组织（IMF）不仅支持这种政策，多年来还一直坚持这一立场。

由于高利率，企业不得不以 36% 的利率借款，这意味着债务规模几乎每两年翻一番（根据 72 法则）。这种状况使得我国经济急需的多元化和结构调整变得遥不可及。因此，我们的经济依然依赖于原材料出口和成品进口，无法摆脱对外部市场的依赖。

我们一直承受着这种短视货币政策带来的负面影响，它给我们的经济带来了结构性瓶颈。这使得加纳无法满足西非国家经济共同体（Ecowas）单一货币 Eco 的趋同标准。我们的经济迫切需要刺激，而将利率从 30% 小幅下调至 29% 是远远不够的。

多年来，加纳塞地一直承受着压力，美元一直在自由浮动，自 2017 年以来对塞地的涨幅几乎达到了 200%。如果不是 2007 年的货币重新定值，今天 1 美元可能需要一袋加纳塞地来换，即 120,000 加纳塞地。当国债投资者以 30% 的名义回报率持有加纳塞地时，我们无法稳定外汇市场。平等法则告诉我们，这种情况不会发生。

全球性震荡还是自作自受？

加纳银行（BoG）可能会将我们的困境归咎于全球冲击。然而，正如我之前所指出的，同样面临全球冲击的赞比亚和肯尼亚，表现却显著好于我们。例如，赞比亚在 2023 年 11 月和 12 月的通胀率分别为 12.9% 和 13.1%，而肯尼亚则分别为 6.8% 和 6.6%。目前，赞比亚银行的基准利率为 11%，肯尼亚中央银行的基准利率为 13%。

不负责任的借贷和腐败问题，加上高昂的借贷成本，使得加纳成为非洲负债最重的国家。遗憾的是，尽管我们采取了艰难的措施，通过严厉的债务减免和重组计划（DDEP）减少国内债务，但我们仍在积累短期债务 -- 91 天国债的利率为 29.35%，182 天国债的利率为 31.95%，364 天国债的利率为 32.49%，即使需求非常高。

高利率反映出经济的不稳定性。因此，不必要的国内高利率已经影响了外部市场对我们的看法，给了国际资本市场掠食者可乘之机。我们不能通过我们的政策利率给外界留下高通胀或高风险信贷的印象，并期望外部金融市场有不同的看法。加纳银行的做法在国际金融市场上对我们造成了巨大的代价，它造成了过度的不稳定风险感知，对我们的信用评级产生了不利影响。加纳可可委员会（COCOBOD）目前正在承受这一后果，不得不以空前的 8% 的利率借款。

谁是受益人？

在商业部门，银行业一直是并且将继续是唯一的受益者，除非未来出现债务减免。很快，我们将再次听到加纳银行惯有的自我服务声明：“尽管经济普遍下滑，但银行业的表现却逆势增长，关键指标包括总资产和存款的强劲增长，以及盈利能力的持续提升……” 然而，在 30% 以上的利率环境中赚钱，并不需要任何银行的天才，即使是在提供了高水平的不良贷款准备之后。

英国金融经济学家、伯明翰阿斯顿大学的讲师 Sajid Mukhtar Chaudhry 博士说得对，他认为加纳的银行过于盈利。他建议征收“银行税”，就像澳大利亚等国家所做的那样，为政府创造更多收入。他认为 “银行如此盈利是不正常的”，并对银行在加纳 “比其他行业赚得多得多” 表示惊讶。

然而，最终，加纳银行自己也成为了其糟糕货币政策的受害者，他们在 2022 年宣布了巨额亏损，总计 600 亿加纳塞地，年末净资产为负 550 亿加纳塞地，理论上来说已经破产。这在我们的历史上是前所未有的。这笔亏损，约等于我们 2022 年国内生产总值（GDP）的 10%，是中央银行有记录以来最大的单年亏损之一。

为何不愿降息？

加纳银行持续坚持当前的货币政策，尽管这一政策并未能有效控制通胀，也对经济结构改革造成了障碍。这种坚持可能是出于对自身利益的考虑。加纳银行在政府业务中的主导地位和货币发行权使其在经济中占据了重要的生存地位。

一个可能的原因是，加纳银行在低利率环境下难以维持自身的运营。这或许可以解释为什么银行需要保持高利率政策，以保护其主要的收入来源 -- 利息收入。在 2022 年这个疫情后的困难时期，加纳银行的利息及类似收入达到了 50.9 亿加纳塞地，比 2021 年的 34.6 亿加纳塞地增长了 47%，占其总营业收入的 92.7%。

此外，在加纳银行面临破产的临界时刻，它可能也不愿意看到利率迅速下降，因为它需要更多的资金来维持运营。550 亿加纳塞地的负净资产是一个巨大的负担。因此，尽管高利率政策未能有效控制通胀，也阻碍了经济改革，但加纳银行可能认为保持高利率是保护自身财务状况的必要手段。

生活在另一个世界

加纳银行 2022 年的年度报告细节揭示了其运营状况的许多信息。如我之前所指出的，预算和实际支出并不像是一个挣扎中国家中央银行应有的状况：新总部大楼耗资 2.5 亿美元，相当于我们国内生产总值的 0.35%；旅行费用为 9.74 亿加纳塞地；机动车维护/运行费用为 13.1 亿加纳塞地；通信费用为 3.2 亿加纳塞地；计算机费用为 6.7 亿加纳塞地；场地和设备费用为 20.77 亿加纳塞地；货币发行费用为 33.69 亿加纳塞地（流通中的货币总额为 407.3 亿加纳塞地）；其他行政费用为 28.783 亿加纳塞地等等。

人员成本总计为 16.2 亿加纳塞地。在总共 2,203 名员工的情况下，这意味着 2022 年平均每名员工的薪酬为 73.5361 万加纳塞地，或每月每名员工 61,280 加纳塞地，包括各种津贴。这些员工还有员工贷款共计 12.47 亿加纳塞地，平均每人 56.6046 万加纳塞地。

据报道，加纳银行还在翻新其区域办公室，同时在塔马利投资 1.42 亿加纳塞地建造了一个拥有 50 张床位的宾馆。

我仍然难以置信加纳银行及其员工生活在完全不同的现实中。除了其过高的运营费用外，正确的成本效益分析也无法证明其投资新总部大楼和非核心活动（如医院和宾馆）的合理性。

加纳银行 vs 英格兰银行

确实，加纳银行的运营收入和支出与英格兰银行相比，有些方面令人难以置信。例如，加纳银行在 2022 年为其 2,203 名员工花费了 16.2 亿加纳塞地（按 2022 年平均加纳塞地-英镑汇率计算约为 1.4727 亿英镑），平均每名员工约为 66,851 英镑。而英格兰银行在 2021-22 财年报告中，拥有平均劳动力的 4,675 名员工，花费了 4.48 亿英镑，平均每名员工约为 95,829 英镑。

与英格兰银行员工不同，加纳银行员工还享受员工贷款，平均每名员工未偿还的贷款为 56.6046 万加纳塞地（51,459 英镑）。

加纳银行 vs 英格兰银行：部分收支数据

*NA：不可用。

加纳银行vs英格兰银行：员工与相关机构

*包括405家国外货币兑换机构

加纳银行的财务报表并未披露个别高管的薪酬，而英格兰银行的报告则披露了非执行董事的薪酬。因此，无法直接比较两者。然而，根据加纳银行的信息，2022 年其 10 名非执行董事共获得 510 万加纳塞地（约合 46.364 万英镑）的薪酬，平均每位董事一年获得 51 万加纳塞地（约合 46,364 英镑），或每月 4.25 万加纳塞地（约合 3,864 英镑）。

英格兰银行关于非执行董事薪酬的声明显示，加纳银行的非执行董事薪酬远高于英格兰银行的同类人员。英格兰银行自 2009 年 6 月 1 日起实行的薪酬标准为非执行董事每年 1.5 万英镑（每月 1,250 英镑）。委员会主席的薪酬略高。非执行董事为委员会服务不收取额外费用。

我好奇加纳银行董事的津贴是否是根据《加纳银行法》的要求，与财政部长协商确定的。

此外，人们也想知道这个理论上已经破产的机构是如何资助其高昂的开支的。加纳银行的奢侈开支是管理不善的现金充裕的国有企业典型的特征，许多这类企业会随意增加薪酬和开支，正如加纳银行员工数量和成本的趋势所示。

加纳银行员工数量和成本趋势

* 仅基于每位董事每月平均683加纳塞地的董事会费用和每月平均517加纳塞地的会议津贴估计。

所以，预算考量是否可以成为加纳银行持续保持高利率的一个重要原因，即通过将其与同比通胀而非预期通胀挂钩？

加纳银行通胀目标之效用

我想强调，加纳银行对通胀目标制的处理方式：

• 并未奏效，也不太可能奏效，因为其政策利率（目前为 29%）似乎与其目标通胀率或预期通胀率（目前预计年底为 15%）没有任何关系
• 成功地将过去的通胀引入未来，让我们陷入高通胀→高利率→高加纳塞地贬值→高通胀的恶性循环，使得加纳的通胀率和货币贬值率在非洲也名列倒数。

通过实际上将政策利率与同比通胀挂钩，加纳银行将我们的经济与过去的通胀挂钩。这种指数化导致了自我实现的预言，导致了 1999 年巴西的实际危机，当时巴西雷亚尔的价值下降了 35%。

正如我之前指出的，我们最近看到的名义通胀率下降主要是由于一年前价格发生的事情，其影响应该会消失。还应该注意的是，尽管维持当前的高政策利率无助于抗击通胀，但加纳银行的政策利率从 30% 降至 20%，例如，不一定会产生通胀后果。因此，这种胆怯的 1% 降息可能受到了围绕加纳银行自身生存问题的影响。

急需转型

在其 2021 年 3 月 1 日至 2022 年 2 月 28 日的年度报告和账目中，英格兰银行将自己描述为“一个以人为本、谦逊的银行，与不断变化的世界同步”。他们对以人为本的银行的定义是“一个员工能够做自己，并公开、诚实地表达他们的观点的地方”。一个谦逊的银行是指“我们倾听和发言一样多，并认识到我们从他人那里学习会变得更强大”。一个与不断变化的世界同步的银行是指“一个向外看、向前看，并将这些洞察应用于我们持久使命的银行”。

多年来未能控制通胀，看到加纳银行追求同样的未能实现预期结果的政策是令人悲哀的。加纳银行是时候倾听并应用更多前瞻性原则来追求其使命了。制定成功的政策需要开放的心态、卓越的想象力和健全的判断力。

加纳银行的目的性和自主性

我想强调，价格稳定并非终极目标。可能更重要的是经济增长和就业创造，加纳银行必须对此表现出兴趣。我们需要澄清加纳银行的使命，并改善其治理，以减轻盈利动机。

正如我之前指出的，国家任何机构都不能声称拥有绝对自主权，加纳银行的独立性也不要求行长同时担任主席。至少，如果这两个角色分开，将增强内部监督。

在英格兰银行，其董事会的有效性和权威性提供了必要的平衡。董事会：

• 有一个独立的非执行主席
• 有一个独立评估办公室支持其工作
• 可以委托外部进行绩效评估（包括对政策决策的回顾性评估）

  
  

  总之，如果加纳银行不改变其掠夺性贷款行为，它将继续破坏我们经济的实体经济部门，并阻碍债券和抵押贷款市场的发展。更糟糕的是，我们迟早要回去第 18 次找国际货币基金组织求救。

BoG’s 1% rate cut is a big joke – Togbe Afede XIV

The Bank of Ghana Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) on Monday, January 29, 2024 announced a cut in the key policy rate of 100 basis points, from 30% to 29%. This sounds like a big joke. It is hard to imagine what impact our BoG officials expect a 1% reduction from 30% to make on lending rates, inflation rate, exchange rate or economic growth, let alone what they expect to learn or observe from it. I wonder whether they have determined the correlation between interest rates, inflation and exchange rates in our country.

The hesitant 1% rate cut to 29% is particularly surprising given their expectation that headline inflation would “ease to 15%±2% by the end of 2024 and gradually trend back to within the medium-term target range of 8%±2% by 2025”. I do not see the relationship between the expected or target 15%±2% inflation and the high 29% monetary policy rate. It gives the impression that our top economists do not believe in themselves or their own forecasts.

More worrying is the possibility that they do not believe in their own numbers, given their new claim of signs of “emerging recovery”, having previously told us that the economy had “turned the corner”.

Policy rate and open market operations

A central bank’s policy rate and open market operations are supposed to influence the rate of inflation. But BoG officials still have a fixation on headline or year-on-year inflation, and so cannot depart from their reactionary monetary policy approach, which responds to what had transpired, that is, past one-year price changes, instead of their expectation of inflation (15%±2% this year). So, the 1% reduction in the policy rate appears to be a reaction to the 3.2% fall in headline inflation in December to 23.2%%, from 26.4% % in November.

Thus, the key rate that commercial banks use as reference for lending has been reduced to 29% after being pegged at 30% for six months. It is also invariably the reference rate for the Government’s domestic borrowing, setting a limit to the Government’s ability to exploit its power as the largest borrower. BoG often talked about “mopping up excess liquidity” without defining what was optimal. But an interest rate policy that results in 30% plus return to money market investors is itself responsible for the delivery of “excess liquidity”.

Victims of a myopic approach

I acknowledge the complexity of the interplay of the various macroeconomic variables. But as I wrote in my previous article, “BoG has failed us”, our ridiculously high interest rates have been partly responsible for our high inflation rates, constantly weakening cedi, business failures, joblessness, and worsening poverty levels, pushing many of our younger compatriots into a desperate search for greener pastures abroad. I am surprised that the IMF not only backed but has insisted on this approach over the years.

It is the reason why businesses have to borrow at 36%, at which rate the amount of indebtedness almost doubles every two years (The Rule of 72). It has made it impossible to achieve the much-needed diversification and restructuring of our economy. So our foreign-dominated economy has remained dependent on the export of raw materials and the importation of finished products.

We have been victims of this myopic approach to monetary policy, that has imposed structural bottlenecks on our economy, for over 20 years. This has made it impossible for Ghana to meet the convergence criteria for the Ecowas single currency, the Eco. Our economy needs urgent stimulation, and a timid 1% rate cut from 30% to 29% will not help.

The cedi has suffered over the years, the dollar having been on the loose, gaining almost 200% over the cedi since 2017. But for the currency redenomination of 2007, US$1 would have been selling at a bagful of cedis, GH₵120,000, today. We cannot stabilise the exchange markets while treasury bill investors are making 30% nominal return on their cedis. Parity laws tell us that will not happen.

Global shocks or self-inflicted tragedy?

BoG will blame global shocks for our woes. But as I pointed out previously, Zambia and Kenya, for example, exposed to the same global shocks, have done remarkably better. Zambia recorded 12.9% and 13.1 inflation rates in November 2023 and December 2023, respectively. Kenya recorded 6.8% and 6.6%, respectively. Today, the Bank of Zambia’s prime rate is 11% and that of the Central Bank of Kenya 13%.

Reckless borrowing and corruption have combined with high cost of borrowing to make Ghana Africa’s most indebted country. Sadly, after taking the difficult step to reduce domestic debt through the draconian DDEP, we are still piling up short term debt - 91 Day Bill at 29.35%, 182 Day Bill at 31.95% and 364 at 32.49% - even when demand is very high.

High interest rates evidence instability. Thus, the unnecessarily high domestic interest rates have fed into external market perception of our outlook, giving international capital market predators a field day. We cannot through our policy rate give an impression of high inflation or high credit risk outlook and expect the external financial markets to think differently. BoG’s approach has been costly for us in the international financial markets, where it has created an exaggerated risk perception, with adverse implications for our credit rating. COCOBOD is currently suffering the consequence, having to borrow at an unprecedented 8%.

Who is benefiting?

In the business sector, banking has been and will be the only beneficiaries, baring any future haircuts. And soon, we will be hearing the usual BoG’s self-serving statement that, “The banking industry’s performance has defied the general economic downturn with strong growth across key metrics including total assets and deposits, as well as sustained improvement in profitability…”. But it does not require any banking ingenuity to make money in a 30% plus interest rate environment, even after providing for high levels of non-performing loans.

British financial economist and lecturer at Aston University in Birmingham, Dr. Sajid Mukhtar Chaudhry, was right when he said that banks in Ghana are too profitable. He suggested the imposition of a ‘Bank Tax’, as done by the likes of Australia, to generate more revenue for the Government. He thinks “it is not normal for banks to be that profitable”, and he expressed surprise that banks “earn much more than other industries" in Ghana.

Ultimately though, BOG were themselves victims of their bad monetary policy, announcing massive losses in 2022, totaling GH₵60 billion, and year-end negative net worth of GH₵55 billion, making it technically bankrupt. This is unprecedented in our history. The loss, equal to about 10% of our 2022 GDP, is one of the largest one-year losses ever recorded by a central bank.

Why the reluctance to cut rates?

But why is BoG clinging to a policy and an approach that has not only failed to keep inflation in check, but also made it difficult to effect the needed structural changes in the economy? The Bank’s virtual monopoly over government business and their ability to print money, no doubt, makes it a survivor.

One thing is clear however: BoG, given its extravagant spending, cannot hold its own in a low interest rate environment. This probably explains the need for the Bank to keep its policy rate high to protect its main revenue source – interest income. Its “interest and similar income” amounted to GH₵5.09 billion in the difficult post-COVID 2022, up 47% from GH₵3,46 billion in 2021, and represents 92.7% of its total operating income of GH₵5.49 billion.

It may also be the case that BOG is reluctant to see interest rates fall quickly at this critical time when it needs to make more money to survive bankruptcy. A GH₵55 billion negative net worth is a huge burden.

Living in a different world

Details of BoG’s 2022 annual report says a lot. As I pointed out previously, budgeted and actual expenditures do not look like those of a struggling country’s central bank: US$250 million for a new head office, equivalent to 0.35% of our GDP; GH₵97.4 million for travel; GH₵131 million for motor vehicle maintenance/running; GH₵32 million for communication; GH₵67 million for computers; GH₵207,7 million for premises and equipment; GH₵336.9 million for currency issue (currency in circulation amounted to GH₵40.73 billion); GH₵287.83 million for other administrative expenses, etc.

Personnel costs amounted to GH₵1.62 billion. With a total of 2,203 employees, this meant an average remuneration of a colossal GH₵735,361 per employee in 2022 or GH₵61,280 monthly per employee, including several allowances. These employees also had staff loans amounting to GH₵1.247 billion, an average of GH₵566,046 per head.

BoG is also reported to be remodeling its regional offices, while investing GH₵142 million in a 50-bed guest house in Tamale.

I still cannot believe BoG and its staff are living in a completely different reality. Apart from its excessive operating expenses, proper cost-benefit analysis would not justify its investment in a new head office building and non-core activities like a hospital and guest houses.

BOG vs Bank of England (BOE)

It is hard to believe how some BoG’s operating income and expenses compare with those of Bank of England (BOE). For example, BoG spent GH₵1.62 billion (£147.27 million at 2022 average cedi-pound exchange rate) on its 2,203 employees, translating to £66,851 per staff. BOE on the other hand, with an average labour force of 4,675 per their 2021-22 financial report, spent £448 million, an average of £95,829 per staff.

Unlike BOE staff, BoG staff also enjoyed staff loans, with an average of GH₵566,046 (£51,459) outstanding per employee.

BOG vs BOE: SOME INCOME AND EXPENDITURE FIGURES

*NA: Not Available

BOG vs BOE: SOME EMPLOYEES AND REGULATED INSTITUTIONS

*Including 405 Foreign Exchange Bureaux.

BOE’s reports disclose the remuneration of individual executives. But BoG’s financial statements do not. So, a comparison is not possible. But BoG’s ten (10) non-executive directors earned GH₵5.1 million in 2022, averaging GH₵510,000 (£46,364) per director for the year, or GH₵42,500 (£3,864) per month.

BOE’s statement on the remuneration of non-executive directors shows that BoG’s non- executive directors are much better remunerated than their BOE counterparts. BOE’s rates, which were effective from 1 June 2009, were set at £15,000 per annum (£1,250 per month) for non-executive directors. Committee Chairs receive a little more. Non- executive directors do not receive any additional fees for serving on Committees.

I wonder whether BoG directors’ allowances were determined “in consultation with the Minister of Finance” as required under the Bank of Ghana Act.

One wonders also how the technically bankrupt institution is funding its exorbitant expenditures. BoG’s extravagance is typical of poorly supervised cash-rich state-owned enterprises, many of which increase remuneration and expenditures at will, as shown by the trend in staff numbers and costs at BOG captured below:

RECENT TRENDS: STAFFING AND STAFF COSTS AT BANK OF GHANA

*Estimate, based on average GH₵683 Board fee per month and average GH₵517 sitting allowance per month only,

So, can budget considerations be an important reason for BoG continuously keeping interest rates high, by linking it to year-on-year inflation instead of expected inflation?

Effectiveness of BOG’s inflation targeting

I want to emphasise that BoG’s approach to inflation targeting:

• has not worked and is unlikely to work because its policy rates (currently 29%) do not appear to have any relationship with its target or expected inflation rates (currently 15% by year-end), and

• has only succeeded in importing past inflation into the future, trapping us in a vicious circle of high inflation→ high interest rate→ high cedi depreciation→ high inflation, making Ghana’s inflation and currency depreciation rates some of the worst on the continent.

  
  

By virtually indexing its policy rate to year-on-year inflation, BoG has indexed our economy to past inflation. This kind of indexation produced the self-fulfilling prophesy that led to the real crisis in Brazil in 1999, when the value of the Brazilian real dropped 35%.

As I pointed out previously, the reduction that we saw in the headline inflation rate recently was largely the result of what happened to prices one year earlier, the effect of which should die out. It should also be noted that, even though maintaining the current high policy rate will not help the fight against inflation, a reduction in BoG’s policy rate from 30% to 20%, for example, should not necessarily produce inflationary consequences. Thus, the timid 1% reduction may have been influenced by the survival issues surrounding BoG itself.

Urgent need for change

In its Annual Report and Accounts 1 March 2021 – 28 February 2022, BOE described itself as “a human and humble Bank, in step with the changing world”. Their definition of a human Bank “is one where colleagues feel able to be themselves and speak openly and honestly about their views. A humble Bank is one where we listen as much as we speak, and recognise that we are made stronger by learning from others. And a Bank in step with the changing world is one that looks outwards and forwards and applies those insights to our enduring mission”.

Having failed over the years to keep inflation in check, it is sad to see BoG pursue the same approach that has failed to deliver the desired outcomes. It is about time BoG listens and applies more forward-looking principles in pursuing its mission. Success in policy formulation requires open-mindedness, outstanding imagination, and sound judgement.

BoG’s objectives and autonomy

I want to emphasise that price stability is not an end in itself. Probably more important are growth and employment generation, in which the BOG must show interest. We need to clarify BOG’s mandate and improve its governance to mitigate the profit motive.

As I pointed out previously, no institution of state can claim absolute autonomy, and neither does the independence of the BOG require that the Governor should be Chairman as well. It will, at the very least, enhance internal check if the two roles are separated.

At BOE, the effectiveness and authority of its Court (Board) of Directors provides the necessary balance. The Court:

• has an independent non-executive chairman

• has an Independent Evaluation Office that supports its work, and

• may commission external performance reviews (including, retrospectively, into policy decisions).

  
  

All said, if BoG does not change its predatory lending practices, it will continue to undermine the real sectors of our economy and frustrate efforts to develop the bond and mortgage markets. Worst still, we will, sooner than later, be back to the IMF for the 18th time.

来源：Joy Business

文：By Togbe Afede XIV

翻译：无尽夏

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