阿索勾力王国国王大酋长（Agbogbomefia）、加纳国家酋长院前主席、迦纳术略集团董事长：十四世·托比·阿菲德阁下

原文：

加纳银行（BOG）的官员们因为 2023 年 11 月的年通胀率降至 26.4%而沾沾自喜，这很有意思。对比 2023 年 10 月为 35.2%，2022 年 12 为 54.1%，我认为，这种趋势应该是可以预料的，因为 2022 年同期曾有大规模的价格上涨和汇率贬值。年通胀数字的误区在于 -- 它们往往受到一年前发生的事情的很大影响。这就是为什么即使某月总体价格水平下降，年通胀率也可能在该月份上升，反之亦然。

当 2022 年底价格和汇率的变化对我们仍然存在影响时，你不能将其描述为 “一时的现象”。市场只是适应了系统中的问题。通胀率回到过去的相对较低水平，并不意味价格同样下降到了过去的水平。2023 年 11 月 26.4% 的年通胀率不值得庆祝。同样面临全球冲击的赞比亚和肯尼亚的年通胀率分别是 12.9% 和 6.8%。目前，美元对塞地价格比 2022 年 6 月高出 150% 以上。

但我很高兴加纳银行终于硬着头皮接受了现实，承认其政策利率不必设定在 “过去的通胀” 之上。经过几十年的坚持，加纳银行认为其政策利率必须高于消费者价格指数（CPI）的年变化，以确保投资者获得 “正的实际回报”，在我们经济崩溃后的几个月里，加纳银行将政策利率保持在消费者价格指数的年变化之下。也许他们的确无法将政策利率设定在最近的超高通胀率之上。

在 2022 年 12 月发表的文章《我们自己造成的巨大经济危机》中，我分享了对于为什么我们加纳，一个拥有丰富人力和物力资源的国家，会陷入当前经济困境的见解。

今日之加纳，显然不是建国先贤所憧憬的模样。我们遭遇了惨重的失败，却假装一切安好。我们的领导者非但未带来希望，反而让民众，尤其是年轻人，感到极度的绝望。

正如我在 2021 年 12 月所言，当议会发言人来访时提到，如果加纳是一家企业，它本应宣布破产。这实际上就是我们在求助于国际货币基金组织（IMF）并实施国内债务重组计划（DDEP）时所做的事。最终未能偿还债务。政府债券的持有者遭受了巨大的损失，未来展望仍然不明朗。

我们正处在崩溃的边缘，这是由于那些可耻的不诚实、腐败、鲁莽、傲慢和分裂的管理措施所导致的，同时也是不当财政和货币政策的受害者。我们能够保持相对的和平与稳定，全靠加纳人民的坚韧和耐心，我祈祷我们能继续保持这些美德。

我深知苦难的滋味，因此我将继续就面临的发展挑战发表见解。

跌跌撞撞的经济

正如我在 2022 年 12 月的文章中所提，非常令人担忧的是，我国债务不断增加，现在已成为非洲债务负担最重的国家。然而，我们仍缺乏发展所需的基本社会经济基础设施，如良好的道路、医院和学校等。更糟糕的是，由于贪婪和鲁莽，我们面临着巨额判决债务。

自 2017 年以来，美元对塞地的汇率已经上涨了近 200%，尽管最近我们的贸易顺差为正，但塞地仍然面临压力。截至 2023 年 10 月底，总出口额达到了 134 亿美元，与总进口额 113 亿美元相比，产生了大约 21 亿美元的贸易顺差。

通货膨胀率仍然很高，达 26.4%，商业失败、失业和贫困水平比以往任何时候都要更加严重。正因如此，太多年轻的同胞绝望地寻找机会，逃离我们这个潜在富裕但实际贫穷的国家。

我们成为被掠夺性经济所害的牺牲品，那些政策或决策被精心包装后呈现给人民，然而在实施过程中我们如梦方醒，设计初衷便是为了让少数特权阶层受益，正如我们在新冠疫情倡议中所看到，以及将加纳电力公司错误地授予 PDS 加纳有限公司的事件。我们也是宪法的受害者，它甚至保护那些最糟糕的领导者。最后，我们看到的便是我们的领导者和他们的亲信们令人讨厌和傲慢的 “显眼消费”。

上帝并非使人贫穷。我仍然乐观地认为，我们可以扭转命运，将美丽的国家变成一个乐园，最大化每个加纳人的福利和幸福，享受真正的可持续和平与团结，并使年轻人无需为了寻找更好的生活踏上最为凶险的旅程。

但首先，我们需要认识和理解造成如今困境的原因。关于我们从未想象过的巨大规模的腐败、加纳的声誉如何受损、其财政政策是如何糟糕、法律的失能、各自为政的地区政策、薄弱的政府机关、我们表达的整体面貌…… 等等。但正如我多次叙述的那样，多年来，加纳银行的货币政策一直是经济政策领域中未被充分审视的一部分。

鸡飞蛋打

最近的事件，包括加纳政府无法履行其债务义务，最终揭示了加纳银行的问题。在过去的几个月里，加纳银行将其政策利率保持在低于年通胀率的水平，这与它以前的做法不同。而且，银行最近宣布在 2022 年遭受了巨额损失，总计 600 亿加纳塞地，年底的净资产为负 550 亿加纳塞地，使其在理论上已然破产。这在我们的历史上是前所未有的。这笔损失相当于我们 2022 年国内生产总值（GDP）6068.2 亿加纳塞地（按 2022 年平均塞地兑美元汇率，8.4:1 计算，相当于 722.4 亿美元）的 10%，是中央银行有记录以来最大的一年期损失之一。

具有讽刺意味的是，加纳银行在最近帮助了多家 “管理不善” 的地方银行、储蓄贷款公司、微型金融机构、金融公司和基金管理公司处理倒闭流传之后，自己陷入困境，代价是 200 亿加纳塞地，而据估计， 90 亿加纳塞地本来已经足够让他们继续运营。作为单纯的清理某些金融部门之举措，这未免太过奢侈。

在竞争激烈的私营企业世界，失败的标准和后果都是严格的，加纳银行本应已经倒闭。2022 年年度报告的细节揭示了他们的预算和实际支出，这些支出看起来不像是一个正在挣扎的国家的中央银行的支出：支出 2.5 亿美元用于建设新总部，相当于我们国内生产总值的 0.35%；支出 9740 万加纳塞地用于旅行；支出 1.31 亿加纳塞地用于车辆维护/运行；支出 3200 万加纳塞地用于通信；支出 6700 万加纳塞地用于计算机；支出 33.69 亿加纳塞地用于货币发行费用（流通中的货币总额为 407.3 亿加纳塞地）；支出 860 万加纳塞地用于董事。

他们对自己的奖励也非常丰厚，将工资提高了惊人的 68%！人员成本达到了 16 亿加纳塞地。总共有 2203 名员工，这意味着这一年，每位员工平均工资为约 726,282 加纳塞地，或折算为每人每月 60,523 加纳塞地。员工贷款达到了 12.47 亿加纳塞地，平均每人大约 566,818 加纳塞地。加纳银行的员工仿佛生活在另一个世界，这令人难以置信。此外，与拥有 4793 名劳动力的英格兰银行（BOE）不同，加纳银行的财务报表并没有披露个别高管的薪酬。

加纳银行曾指责倒闭银行的不良商业行为，但它显然被过去几年报告的虚假利润误导，而同样开始了上述描述的鲁莽行为。我称之为 “虚假利润”，因为其中包括了那些不可能收回的收入（政府应支付的利息）。在 2020 年报告中，显示加纳银行取得了 15.7 亿加纳塞地（2.7 亿美元）的利润。而英格兰银行（BOE）在 2020/21 年只获得了 5700 万英镑（7600万美元）的利润。加纳的经济规模为 720 亿美元，而英国的经济规模为 2.7 万亿美元。通过以上对比可知，加纳银行的利润几乎是英格兰银行的 4 倍，而实际上，英国的经济规模是加纳的 40 倍。

令人惊讶的是，作为政府银行的加纳银行，竟然忽视了政府可能违约的可能性，并且没有作出适当的准备。同样令人惊讶的是，外部审计师似乎也没有注意到政府欠加纳银行的债务质量极差。加纳银行的董事们同样不知情。这种减值并非突然发生。实际上，加纳银行在监控其监管的金融机构的资产质量，但却忘记了自己那些资产。

加纳银行的巨额 “利润” 主要来源于无端过高的利率，这对实体经济部门造成了损害。这些利润支持了他们不必要的高运营成本，包括向员工和董事支付的高额薪酬。商业银行也从高利率中受益，但与加纳银行一样，他们的债务人（政府和其它贷款客户）无法承受这些异常的高额利率，因此这些银行在 2022 年也出现了巨额的债务损失。

我们还没有走出困境，因为所有这些现象对经济的影响还在持续，借款人的违约行为还会持续一段时间。然而令人感叹的是，就在经济陷入困境的几个月前，加纳银行还在赞扬银行部门，声称：“银行业的表现克服了整体经济下滑， 2022 年上半年在包括总资产和存款在内的关键指标上实现了强劲增长，同时行业内的盈利能力也持续改善。” 他们还如此表示：“银行业的总资产增长了 22.8%，达到 2000 亿加纳塞地。2022 年 6 月，总资产中的国内部分同比增长了 23.5%，而 2021 年 6 月的增长率为 18%。” 他们进一步补充说：“…截至年中，行业资产增长较高，主要是由于在审查期间存款和借款出现的增加。”

但正如我所指出的，不可否认的事实是，所有这些所谓的 “增长” 都是由高利率驱动的，实际上是将资产从政府、公众和实体经济部门转移到银行部门。加纳银行和商业银行的巨额利润如同寄生虫一般，不仅给私营部门带来了巨大压力，也给公共部门带来了压力。它们对银行部门以外的人造成了沉重负担，并阻碍了经济中所需的结构性改革的实现。

多年来，加纳银行的货币政策一直未受到审查，因为我们中的许多人错误地认为加纳银行的专家们是不会犯错的。我们错了，至少证据表明如此。

2003 年我对加纳的货币政策提出意见，在那之后就再也没有人公开讨论货币政策应当如何进行了。而我在 2003 年提出的论点，在 20 多年后的今天仍然适用。加纳银行几乎直接将其政策利率与年通胀率挂钩，如同滚雪球那样，这一政策对通货膨胀、加纳塞地的货币价值和整个经济的负面影响是可以预见的。我相信我们中的许多人应当已经意识到了：失败的货币政策一直是国家的关键问题之一。

拜这种僵化的利率政策所赐，加纳银行试图使其政策利率始终高于年通胀率。在 2021 年 12 月，他们对我所提出的问题的回应中，加纳银行辩称：“简单的金融学理论表明，投资的回报会受通货膨胀的影响，投资者在做决定时总是考虑实际利率。在 11% 的通货膨胀率背景下，中央银行 13.5% 的政策利率即为 2.5% 的实际利率。”遗憾的是，这些可怜的经济学理论，得到了一些所谓“杰出的非洲经济学家”的支持，他们在评论我提出的问题时表示：“ … 应该注意的是， 13.5% 的贷款利率是名义上的。加纳当前的通货膨胀率约为 10.5%，因此实际利率为 3%。”

现在经济已经陷入低谷，加纳银行一改作风，将其政策利率保持在年通胀率之下已有数月之久，这与他们的主张可谓南辕北辙。

重要的是要认识到，年通胀率是一个历史概念，利率所补偿的不是过去的价格变化。确定政策利率的相关通胀率时，应当采用的是预期通胀率，并考虑到季节性等因素进行调整。预期通胀率是精明投资者关注的重点，这与他们在评估股票投资时更看重前瞻市盈率（P/E）而非滞后市盈率的做法相似。

未来价格趋势可通过对消费者价格指数的最新平均变化进行年化测量来更准确地预测，例如采用三个月的平均值，并调整食品和能源价格等因素（核心CPI），这将提供更准确的实时信息，以便微调货币政策。

以欧文·费雪的名字命名的费雪效应描述了通货膨胀、名义利率和实际利率之间的关系，并解释了为什么预期通胀高时利率会上升，预期通胀低时利率会下降。因此，如果预期实际利率保持不变，预期通胀的下降应该导致名义利率同等下降。在我们目前的情况下，加纳银行的预期通胀目标是 8%。所以，8% 加上预期实际利率应该得出一个合理的名义利率。当前 30% 利率的政策将让贷款者承担 22% 的预期实际利率！

遗憾的是，我们的经济学家没有意识到在确定实际利率时，将当前利率与过去年通胀率进行比较是错误的。加纳银行基于年通胀率固定其政策利率，对最近月度变化几乎没有兴趣，使得过去的通胀影响未来的经济，使我们陷入高通胀→高利率→高通胀 的恶性循环，并使加纳的通胀率在过去二十年中陷入非洲倒数的境地。

穷国与富国：成本推动型与需求拉动型通货膨胀

加纳银行坚持使用高利率来对抗加纳的通货膨胀，这在逻辑上并不合理，尤其是当利率是基于（历史）年通胀率来设定时。提高利率对抗通货膨胀在如英国这样的富裕国家通常有效。英国的最低工资是每小时 9.50 英镑，或者每天 8 小时工作，每天 76 英镑。而在加纳，最低工资是每天 14.88 加纳塞地，这还不到 1 英镑。目前，英国的平均汽油价格约为每升 1.57 英镑，占日最低工资的 2%。而在加纳，平均汽油价格约为 14 加纳塞地，占日最低工资的 94%。

生活必需品的情况也类似。因此，与英国不同，提高利率只会增加加纳的生活成本，而不能起到鼓励加纳人节约开支的效果，因为他们几乎无法维持生计。

此外，对于对抗由食品或原油价格上涨或对石油产品加税等因素导致的成本推动型通货膨胀，提高政策利率的效果难以显现。遗憾的是，即使在 COVID-19 大流行高峰期，全球收入水平下降的情况下，各地都在实施刺激计划以促进经济活动时，加纳银行仍然让我们承受了极高的利率压力。

加纳银行通胀目标制货币政策之影响

多年来，加纳银行的货币政策成功地在非洲创造了一个在书面报告中最盈利的银行部门，同时却打造了一个抑制增长的高通胀→高利率→高通胀 的恶性循环环境，这对加纳塞地货币和经济产生了灾难性的后果。

1. 通货膨胀

加纳银行对通胀目标制的处理方法并未取得成效。在 2021 年 12 月，英格兰银行为了实现 2% 的通胀目标，将其主要利率从 0.1% 上调至 0.25%。相比之下，加纳银行的政策利率与其 8% 的通胀目标并无关联。加纳银行将政策利率从 13.5% 提升至 14.5%，更多关注的是报告中的年通胀率（过去的）12.2%，试图保持基于其对实际利率不恰当理解的“正实际利率”。

值得注意的是，赞比亚在 2021 年 11 月的通胀率为 19.3%，但其中央银行（CBZ）的主要利率却低至 9%。到 2023 年 11 月，赞比亚的通胀率降至 12.9%，而加纳的当前通胀率为 26.4%。如今，赞比亚中央银行的主要利率为 11%。然而，仍在追求 8% 通胀目标的加纳银行，却维持着 30.0% 的政策利率。因此，加纳银行长期以来设定的 8±2% 通胀目标似乎只是一种书面表示，这已成为了其货币政策发布中的标准格式。

正如我之前所指出的，我们最近看到的主要通胀率下降只是去年价格变化所导致的自然结果。应该注意的是，尽管维持当前的高政策利率无助于抗击通胀，但假如将加纳银行的政策利率从 30% 降至 20%，也并不会引发通胀。因此，完全没有必要保持当前 30% 的高政策利率。

2. 利率

加纳银行仍在追求同样的抑制增长的需求侧通胀问题解决方法，我们发现加纳陷入了高通胀→高利率→高通胀 的恶性循环。遗憾的是，国际货币基金组织多年来一直鼓励使用错误的货币政策和通胀概念。作为我们的“顾问”，他们与我们共同承担了责任，并承担了帮助我们的义务。我推测法语区以外的其他非洲国家也经历了类似的艰难境遇。

因此，在采取了通过严厉的国内债务摊销计划而艰难地减少了国内债务之后，加纳仍在积累短期债务 --  91 天国库券的利率为 29.35%，182 天国库券的利率为 31.95%，而 364 天国库券的利率为 32.49%。

3. 货币贬值

加纳银行的货币政策中，极高的利率在过去 20 多年里一直拖累着加纳的经济发展。这些利率不仅推动了货币供应量的增加，进而导致价格上涨，还削弱了加纳塞地的价值。与他们所声称的相反，我们无法通过“提高利率来维持汇率稳定”。尤其是在他们未能保护加纳塞地作为加纳唯一法定货币的情况下，高利率既没有帮助我们，也无法帮助我们“维持汇率稳定”。等价法所言完全与事实相反。

举个例子，假如现在是 2007 年 11 月 1 日，1 加纳塞地等同于 1 美元。如果这天将 1 加纳塞地投资于加纳政府的 91 天国库券，并在 15 年内滚动投资，到 2022 年 10 月 31 日，在我们的经济危机高峰期，它将增长到大约12 加纳塞地。巧合的是，2022 年 10 月 31 日的 1 美元价格恰好约为 13 加纳塞地！显然，加纳塞地在这笔投资上获得了巨大的回报，但是这种回报具有通胀性，而且拉低了美元对塞地的汇率。2022 年 10 月的通胀率为 40.4%。与此同时，美元价格上涨了 141%，从 2021 年 10 月的平均 6 加纳塞地上涨到 2022 年 10 月的 14.47 加纳塞地，意味着加纳塞地整整贬值了 58.53%。

4. 外部借贷成本

过高的利率已经影响了外部市场对加纳前景的认知。我们不能通过我们的政策利率给人一种高通胀风险展望的印象，并期望外部金融市场有不同的想法。加纳银行的方法在国际金融市场上代价高昂，它创造了一种夸大的风险感知，对我们的信用评级和借款成本产生了不利影响。可可委员会（COCOBOD）目前正在遭受其行为的后果，不得不以前所未有的 8% 利率借款。

在 2022 年 10 月 7 日星期五，在美国华盛顿特区举行的新闻发布会上，非洲进出口银行（Afreximbank）的首席经济学家和研究主任 Hippolyte Fofack 博士详细阐述了主题“动荡的全球金融架构中的发展中国家”的重要性：

“非洲的总外部债务约为 7260 亿美元，不到意大利债务的 1/3，意大利债务估计约为 2.8 万亿美元。并且，如果以 GDP 的百分比来表示，非洲的总外部债务是 27%，而欧洲是 130%。然而，由于对非洲主权和公司实体分配的大额利差和违约驱动的借款利率，非洲银行比欧洲同行更容易陷入债务困境。”

5. 宏观经济

高利率使得资本成本过高，进而导致企业难以借款投资于经济的实际部门，特别是制造业，这使得加纳难以取得所需的增值利润。因此，加纳仍然是初级产品的出口国。

它还损害了加纳的生产能力、扩张能力，并加剧了本国的进口依赖。本地企业家遭受了更多，他们无法借款、投资和增加本地所有权，这实际上巩固了外国对加纳经济的控制。这些和其他结构性瓶颈对通胀产生了显著的供给侧和成本推动效应。

因此，加纳银行的政策一直是创建有利金融市场的绊脚石，并间接阻碍了经济结构的重组，他们经常将经济结构的重组视为解决我们的国际收支赤字和货币贬值问题的解决方案。

加纳银行的授权、股息与治理

我们应该记住，价格稳定本身并不是目的。也许更重要的是增长和就业创造，加纳银行必须对此表现出兴趣。我们需要澄清加纳银行的授权并改进其治理，以减轻利润动机。

原则上，加纳银行应该将其利润交给其唯一的股东，即政府，由政府决定加纳银行可以保留多少利润。加纳银行不应能在独立于股东的情况下做出利润分配的决定。这不属于中央银行独立性的部分。但是，股东的无同情心的态度让加纳银行保留了并滥用了其“利润”。

还值得注意的是，加纳银行的独立性并不要求行长同时担任董事长。如果这两个角色分开，将增强内部监督的力度。

Togbe Afede XIV: Bank of Ghana Has Failed Us

It was interesting to hear Bank of Ghana (BOG) officials pat themselves on the back because year-on-year inflation had dropped to 26.4% in November 2023, from 35.2% in October 2023 and 54.1% in December 2022. This trend should have been expected, I thought, because of the massive price increases and exchange rate depreciation that were recorded during the corresponding periods in 2022. It is a fallacy of year-on-year inflation numbers - they tend to be influenced a lot by what happened one year ago. That is why year-on-year inflation may rise in a particular month even when the general price level has fallen in that month, and vice versa.

You cannot describe what happened to prices and exchange rates towards the end of 2022 as “a blip” when the effects are still with us. The markets simply adjusted to the rot in the system. A return to the relatively lower inflation rates of the past does not mean prices have become lower. A year-on-year inflation rate of 26.4% in November 2023 is not worthy of celebration. Zambia and Kenya, exposed to the same global shocks, recorded 12.9% and 6.8%, respectively. And the US dollar is currently trading at more than 150% of its price (cedis) in June 2022.

But I am glad that Bank of Ghana (BOG) has finally bitten the bullet, accepting that it does not have to set its policy rate above “past inflation”. After decades of insisting that its policy rate must be fixed above year-on-year changes in the consumer price index (CPI) to ensure “positive real returns” to investors, BOG had over the past several months, following the collapse of our economy, kept their policy rate below the year-on-year changes in the CPI. Maybe it was the case that they just could not set the policy rate above the recent hyperinflation rates.

In my December 2022 article, “Our Self-Inflicted Monumental Economic Crisis”, I presented my thoughts on the reasons why we, Ghanaians, find ourselves in this undeserved economic mess, given our massive human and material resource endowments.

The Ghana we have today is obviously not what our founding fathers dreamt of. We have failed woefully but have pretended otherwise. Instead of giving hope, our leaders have created a frightening sense of helplessness among the populace, especially the youth.

As I said earlier in December 2021, during a courtesy call by the Speaker of Parliament, Ghana would have filed for bankruptcy if it were a company. This was effectively what we did when we went back to the IMF for bailout and implemented the Domestic Debt Exchange Programme (DDEP). We eventually defaulted on our debts. Holders of Government bonds suffered massive losses, and the outlook remains dim.

We have been brought to the brink by despicably dishonest, corrupt, reckless, arrogant, and divisive leadership. We are also victims of bad fiscal and monetary policies. We owe our relative peace and stability to the resilience and patience of Ghanaians, and I pray that we remain so. I know what suffering is like, and that is why I will continue to share my thoughts on our development challenges.

AN ECONOMY IN SHAMBLES

Very alarming, as I wrote in my December 2022 article, is the fact that we have piled on so much debt, and are now Africa’s most indebted country, yet we still lack the basic socio-economic infrastructure required for development – good roads, hospitals, schools, etc. Making matters worse, are the massive judgment debts, the results of greed and recklessness, staring us in the face.

The dollar had been on the loose, gaining almost 200% over the cedi since 2017. The cedi is still under pressure notwithstanding our positive trade surplus in recent times. Total exports at the end of October 2023 stood at USD13.4 billion. Compared to the total import value of $11.3 billion, the result was a positive trade balance of about $2.1 billion.

Inflation, as I have already said, is still high, at 26.4%, and business failures, joblessness and poverty levels are worse than ever. That is why too many of our younger compatriots are desperately on the lookout for ways out of our potentially rich but poor country.

We are victims of predatory economics, where policies or decisions were presented to us well-packaged, only for us to realise during implementation that they were designed to benefit a privileged few, as we saw with some of the COVID-19 initiatives and in the ill-fated award of Electricity Company of Ghana to PDS Ghana Ltd. We are also victims of a constitution that protects even our worst leaders. The result is the annoying and arrogant display of “conspicuous consumption” by our leaders and their cronies.

I hold the view that poverty is not God’s desire for man. So, I remain optimistic that we can turn our fortunes around and make a paradise out of our beautiful country, maximise the welfare and happiness of every Ghanaian so that we can enjoy genuine sustainable peace and unity and make it unnecessary for the youth to embark on hazardous journeys in search for greener pastures.

But we need, first, to identify and understand the causes of our predicament. So much has been said about corruption at a scale we could never have imagined, our battered reputation, bad fiscal policy, lawlessness, divisive tribal politics, our weak institutions, our attitudes, etc. But, as I have said many times, one segment of economic policy that has escaped scrutiny over the years is the Bank of Ghana’s monetary policy.

THE CHICKENS HAVE COME HOME TO ROOST

Recent events, including the Government’s inability to service its debt obligations, have finally exposed BOG. Over the past several months, BOG maintained its policy rate below the year-on-year inflation rate, departing from its previous approach. And the Bank recently announced massive losses in 2022, totalling GHS60 billion, and a year-end negative net worth of GHS55 billion, making it technically bankrupt. This is unprecedented in our history. The loss, equal to 10 % of our 2022 GDP of GHS606.82 billion (USD72.24 billion at the average 2022 cedi-dollar exchange rate of 8.4:1), is one of the largest one-year losses ever recorded by a central bank.

It is an irony that BOG finds itself in this mess after it only recently aided the collapse of several “poorly managed” local banks, savings and loans companies, microfinance institutions, finance houses, and fund management companies, at a cost of GHS20 billion, when an estimated GHS9 billion could have kept them in operation. Such a wasteful approach to cleaning up the financial sector could only have been pursued by an organization that thought it had too much money.

In the competitive world of private enterprise, where standards and consequences of failure are exacting, BOG would have gone under. Details of the 2022 annual report reveal budgeted and actual expenditures that do not look like those of a struggling country’s central bank: USD250 million for a new head office, equivalent to 0.35% of our GDP; GHS97.4 million for travel; GHS131 million for motor vehicle maintenance/running; GHS32 million for communication; GHS67 million for computers; GHS336.9 million for currency issue expenses (currency in circulation amounted to GHS40.73 billion); and GHS8.6 million for directors.

And they rewarded themselves very well, increasing their salaries by a whopping 68%! Personnel costs amounted to GHS1.6 billion. With a total of 2,203 employees, this means an average of a colossal GHS726,282 per annum or GHS60,523 per month per employee. Staff loans amounted to GHS1.247 billion, an average of GHS566,818 per employee. I still cannot believe BOG staff are living in a different world. Unlike in the case of the Bank of England (BOE), with a labour force of 4,793, BOG’s financial statements do not disclose the remuneration of individual executives.

BOG, guilty of the poor business practices it had accused the collapsed banks of, had obviously been misled by the spurious profits it reported in previous years to embark on the recklessness depicted above. I call them “spurious profits” because they included revenues (interest payments due from the Government) that were never going to be realised. The Bank reported a profit of GHS1.57 billion (USD270 million) in 2020. Comparatively, the Bank of England (BOE) made a profit of only GBP57 million (USD76 million) in 2020/21. The size of the Ghanaian economy was USD72 billion, and that of the UK was USD2.7 trillion. Thus, BOG reported almost 4 times as much profit as BOE, even though the UK economy was 40 times that of Ghana.

It is surprising that the BOG, the Government’s bankers, had been oblivious to the obvious possibility of the Government defaulting on its obligations, and failed to make appropriate provisions. It is also surprising that the external auditors appeared not to have noticed the poor quality of debt owed to BOG by the Government. The BOG directors were similarly unaware. The impairment did not happen suddenly. In effect, BOG was monitoring the quality of the assets of the financial institutions it regulates but forgot to examine its own.

BOG’s huge “profits” were largely the result of unnecessarily high interest rates which have been detrimental to the real sectors. These profits supported their unnecessarily high operating costs, including the abnormally high remunerations paid to staff and directors. The commercial banks also benefitted from the high-interest rates. But, like BOG, their debtors (Government and other loan customers) could not bear these abnormally high lending rates, hence the massive debt losses these banks also reported in 2022.

We are not out of the woods yet because the impact of all this on the economy means defaults by borrowers will continue for some time. Just a few months before our economy ran into trouble, BOG was praising the banking sector, claiming, “The banking industry’s performance has defied the general economic downturn with strong growth across key metrics including total assets and deposits, as well as sustained improvement in profitability within the industry during the first half of 2022.” And that, “The sector’s total assets increased by 22.8 per cent to GHS200billion at the end of the period. The domestic component of total assets recorded a higher growth rate of 23.5 per cent in June 2022 compared to a growth of 18 per cent in June 2021”. They added further that “…the higher growth in the industry’s assets by mid-year was primarily on the back of an upsurge in deposits and borrowings during the review period”.

But as I pointed out, the undeniable truth is that all these “growths” were fueled by high-interest rates and were, effectively, a transfer of assets from government, the public, and the real sectors to the banking sector. BOG and the commercial banks’ huge parasitic profits put a lot of stress not only on the private sector but on the public sector as well. They imposed a huge burden on those outside the banking sector and frustrated the realisation of the structural changes needed in the economy.

POLICY RATE, INTEREST RATES AND INFLATION

BOG’s monetary policy has escaped scrutiny over the years because many of us had assumed that the ladies and gentlemen at BOG were infallible professionals. We have been wrong, at least so says the evidence.

Not since 2003 when I complained about monetary policy in this country has there been any open debate about how monetary policy has been conducted. The arguments I made in 2003, more than 20 years ago, are still valid today. BOG had virtually indexed its policy rate to year-on-year inflation, a self-fulfilling prophecy, with predictably adverse consequences for inflation, the value of the cedi, and the economy at large. I believe many of us have now realised that the failure of monetary policy has been a key part of our problems.

By this dogmatic interest rate policy, BOG tried to keep its policy rate above year-on-year inflation. In their December 2021 article in response to my concerns, BOG argued that “The simple theory underpinning finance suggests that investors will always have to be compensated for inflation and that investors always factor in real interest rates in making decisions. With an inflation rate of 11 per cent, the central bank’s policy rate of 13.5 per cent implies a real interest rate of 2.5 per cent”. That is poor economics, sadly supported by some “eminent African economists in their comment on the concerns I raised, thus, “..it should be noted that 13.5% lending rate is nominal. Ghana's current inflation rate is about 10.5%, and hence the real rate is 3%”.

Now that the economy has taken a nosedive, the BOG suddenly became happy to keep its policy rate below the year-on-year inflation rate over several months, when they had always argued for the opposite.

It is important to appreciate that year-on-year inflation is a historical concept, and that, it is not past price changes that interest rates must seek to compensate for. The relevant inflation rate for fixing the policy rate is expected inflation, adjusted for seasonality, etc. Expected inflation is what astute investors are interested in, much the same way they look at forward price-earnings (P/E) ratios as opposed to trailing P/E ratios in evaluating shares for investment purposes.

Future price trends are measured more accurately by the annualised latest average changes in the CPI, say a three-month average, adjusted for food and energy prices, etc. (Core CPI), which would give better real-time information for fine-tuning monetary policy.

The Fisher effect, named after Irving Fisher, defines the link between inflation, nominal interest rate, and real interest rate, and explains the tendency for interest rates to rise when expected inflation is high and fall when expected inflation is low. Thus, a fall in expected inflation, if the expected real interest rate is unchanged, should cause an equal fall in the nominal interest rate. In our current context, the expected inflation is BOG’s 8% target. So, 8% plus the expected real interest rate should give us an acceptable nominal interest rate. The current policy rate of 30% translates into an expected real interest rate of 22%!

Sadly, our economists have failed to realise the fallacy in comparing the current interest rate to past year-on-year inflation to determine the real interest rate. BOG’s fixation of its policy rate based on year-on-year inflation, with little or no interest in recent month-on-month changes, has been a self-fulfilling prophecy that has only succeeded in importing past inflation into the future, trapping us in a vicious circle of high inflation→ high-interest rate→ high inflation, and making Ghana’s inflation rate one of the worst on the continent over the past two decades.

POOR VS RICH COUNTRY; COST-PUSH VS DEMAND-PULL INFLATION

BOG’s persistence in trying to fight inflation in Ghana using high interest rates does not make logical sense, especially when it is indexed to (historical) year-on-year inflation. Raising interest rates to fight inflation often works in a rich country like the UK. The minimum wage in the UK is GBP9.50 an hour or GBP76 for an 8-hour workday. In Ghana, the minimum wage is GHS14.88 per day, less than GBP1. The average cost of a litre of petrol currently is about GBP1.57 in the UK, that is, 2% of the daily minimum wage. In Ghana, the average cost of petrol is about GHS14, that is, 94% of the daily minimum wage.

The relativities are similar to other necessities of life. So, unlike in the UK, increasing interest rates will only increase the cost of living in Ghana, but will not encourage the average Ghanaian, who can hardly make ends meet, to spend less and save more.

Also, it is difficult to see how policy rate increases can fight cost-pushed inflation resulting from factors like food or crude oil price increases or increased taxes on petroleum products. Sadly, even at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, when income levels had fallen worldwide, and stimulus packages were being implemented everywhere to boost economic activity, BOG still ensured that we suffered under strangulating high interest rates.

EFFECTS OF BOG’S INFLATION TARGETING MONETARY POLICY APPROACH

BOG’s monetary policy over the years has succeeded in creating one of the most profitable banking sectors in Africa per the accounting reports, while ensuring a growth-stifling high inflation→ high-interest rate→ high inflation environment, with disastrous consequences for the cedi and the economy.

Inflation

BOG’s approach to inflation targeting has not worked. In December 2021 BOE increased its prime rate from 0.1% to 0.25%, to meet a 2% inflation target. BOG’s policy rate, on the other hand, had no relationship with its target inflation of 8%. BOG raised its policy rate from 13.5% to 14.5%, focusing more on the reported year-on-year (past) inflation of 12.2%, in a bid to maintain a “positive real interest rate” based on their awkward understanding of real interest rate.

It is worth noting that Zambia’s November 2021 inflation rate was 19.3%, but the Central Bank of Zambia’s (CBZ’s) prime rate was as low as 9%. Zambia recorded 12.9% inflation in November 2023, while Ghana’s current inflation rate is 26.4%. Today, CBZ’s prime rate is 11%. But BOG, which is still targeting inflation of 8%, maintains a policy rate of 30.0%. BOG’s perennial inflation target of 8±2% thus appears to be at best an expression of desire which has become a template in their monetary policy releases.

As I pointed out earlier, the reduction that we saw in the headline inflation rate recently was only a natural result of what happened to prices one year ago. It should be noted that, even though maintaining the current high policy rate will not help the fight against inflation, a reduction in BOG’s policy rate from 30% to 20%, for example, should not produce inflationary consequences. There is therefore absolutely no need to maintain the current high policy rate of 30%.

Interest Rates

BOG is still pursuing the same, growth-stifling, demand-side approach to the inflation problem, and we find ourselves locked in the vicious circle of high inflation→ high-interest rate→ high inflation. Sadly, the IMF has encouraged the use of the wrong monetary policy and inflation concept over the years. As our “advisors”, they share the blame for the mess we are in and have an obligation to help. I suspect some other African countries outside the French block have suffered similarly.

So, after taking the difficult step to reduce domestic debt through the draconian DDEP, we are still piling up short-term debt - 91 Day Bill at 29.35%, 182 Day Bill at 31.95% and 364 at 32.49%.

Currency Depreciation

BOG’s astronomically high monetary policy rates have burdened our economy over the past 20-plus years. It has not only fueled increases in money supply over the years, fueling price increases but has also undermined the cedi. Contrary to their claims, we cannot use “higher interest rates to maintain exchange rate stability”, especially when they have failed to protect the cedi as the only legal tender in Ghana. High-interest rates have not and will not help us “maintain exchange rate stability”. Parity laws tell us the opposite.

On November 1, 2007, GHS1 was equivalent to USD1. GHS1 invested in the Ghana Government’s 91-day treasury bill on that day and rolled over for 15 years would grow to about GHS12 on October 31, 2022, at the height of our economic crisis. Coincidentally, the price of USD1 on October 31, 2022 was about GHS13! Obviously, this huge return on the Cedi has been inflationary and pulled with it the value of the dollar in Cedi terms. Inflation was 40.4% in October 2022. Along with it, the dollar went up 141%, from average GHS6 in October 2021 to GHS14.47, implying cedi depreciation of 58.53%.

External Borrowing Costs

The unnecessarily high-interest rate numbers have fed into the external market perception of our outlook. We cannot through our policy rate give an impression of a high inflation risk outlook and expect the external financial markets to think differently. BOG’s approach has been costly for us in the international financial markets, where it has created an exaggerated risk perception, with adverse implications for our credit rating and borrowing costs. COCOBOD is currently suffering the consequence, of having to borrow at an unprecedented 8%.

Speaking during a press briefing on Friday, October 7, 2022, in Washington, DC, on the 2022 edition of the Babacar Ndiaye Lecture, Dr Hippolyte Fofack, Chief Economist and Director of Research at Afreximbank elaborated on the importance of the year’s theme, “The Developing World in a Turbulent Global Financial Architecture”:

“Africa’s total external debt is about USD726 billion. That makes it less than a third of Italy’s debt estimated at about $2.8 trillion. And expressed as a percentage of GDP, Africa’s total external debt is 27%, compared to 130% in Europe. Yet African countries are more at risk of debt distress than their European counterparts largely as a result of large spreads and default-driven borrowing rates assigned to African sovereign and corporate entities.”

The Economy at Large

High-interest rates have made the cost of capital excessive and made it difficult for businesses to borrow to invest in the real sectors of the economy, especially manufacturing, making it difficult to realise the value addition we crave. So, we have remained exporters of primary products.

They have also hurt our ability to expand production capacity generally and perpetuated our import dependence. Local entrepreneurs have suffered more, and their inability to borrow, invest and increase local ownership has ensured the foreign domination of our economy. These and other structural bottlenecks have had significant supply-side and cost-push effects on inflation.

Thus, BOG’s policies have been a stumbling block to creating an enabling financial market and have inadvertently frustrated the restructuring of the economy, which they have often identified as the solution to our balance of payments deficit and currency depreciation problems.

BOG MANDATE, DIVIDENDS AND GOVERNANCE

We should remember that price stability is not an end in itself. Probably more important is growth and employment generation, in which the BOG must show interest. We need to clarify BOG’s mandate and improve its governance to mitigate the profit motive.

In principle, BOG should have turned over its profit to its only shareholder, the Government, which should determine how much of the profit BOG can keep. BOG should not be able to make decisions on profit distribution independently of the shareholder. That is not part of Central Bank independence. But shareholder apathy has allowed BOG to keep and misuse its “profits”.

It is also important to point out that the independence of the BOG does not require that the Governor should be Chairman. It will enhance internal checks if the two roles are separated.

来源：Joy Online

翻译：无尽夏

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